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Abstract 
This is the final chapter of The AIG Story, a book about the growth of a large international 
insurance company that pioneered the opening of new markets and helped forge milestone 
international trade agreements, followed by an account of its near-destruction, first at the hands 
of an overzealous state attorney general and underwhelming board of directors, and then, as 
detailed in this chapter, at the hands of federal government officials overwhelmed by a financial 
crisis they could not understand. This chapter begins in mid-2008, when AIG’s losing financial 
products bets presented the company with a huge liquidity problem, though it commanded nearly 
a trillion dollars in assets that made it entirely solvent. The world’s largest banks faced both 
liquidity and solvency problems that threatened a global financial meltdown. Swooping into the 
maelstrom, the U.S. Treasury and New York Fed engineered a solution that portrayed AIG as the 
greatest villain of the crisis and its treatment by the government as a rescue of the company. The 
truth is more complex and this chapter of the book explains, in what Kirkus has aptly described, 









In July 2008, Robert Willumstad, AIG’s chairman and chief executive, 
informed its board that the company would soon face a liquidity problem.1 During 
July and August, AIG continued to pursue routine negotiations with customers, 
including Goldman Sachs, to settle disagreements about valuations given market 
uncertainty. The two would compromise by AIG paying a discount from the face 
value of the contracts, something less than 100 cents on the dollar, and reducing 
posted collateral accordingly. From late July through early September, Willumstad 
pursued extraordinary discussions with officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York about the possibility of the Fed lending AIG money by opening its 
“discount window,” the liquidity resource it uses to support the nation’s banking 
system.2  
None of these overtures produced desired results. By mid-September, AIG 
was in a liquidity crunch, needing $9 billion in cash to survive the week—astonishing 
for a company commanding $800 billion in assets.3 On Friday, September 12, AIG 
was unable to access a routine source of funds, the commercial paper market, as 
collateral calls rose, reaching $7.6 billion from Goldman alone and totaling $23.4 
billion.4 In late August, Greenberg and Willumstad had dinner in Greenberg’s 
apartment building in New York. Greenberg offered to assist AIG in any way that 
he could. Willumstad declined the assistance, expressing concern that he said the 
board shared, that allowing Greenberg to help would “overshadow “ him—the 
same concern some board members expressed three years earlier at the time of his 
resignation.5 
During the global financial crisis of 2008, many institutions, domestic and 
foreign, faced illiquidity or insolvency as the world financial system teetered. The Fed 
opened its discount window to nearly any applicant, dispensing hundreds of billions of 
dollars in loans to scores of U.S. banks and many foreign ones, including Dexia of 
Belgium, Depfa Bank of Ireland, the Bank of Scotland, and Arab Banking 
Corporation, then 29 percent owned by the Libyan central bank.6 All these 
arrangements were made at market interest rates with the borrowers posting reasonable 
security. The Fed lent Bank of America $91 billion and Morgan Stanley $107 
billion—at a market interest rate of 1.5 percent, in exchange for the customary 
borrower promise to repay, without the government taking any equity ownership; 
it lent Citigroup $99 billion on such terms, though also taking nearly 30 percent of 
its equity7 while guaranteeing $300 billion of its debt.8 The Treasury supplied some 
$200 billion to others through its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), often using 
creative maneuvers to grant requests. The Hartford, an insurance company, bought a 
small bank (for $10 million) in order to characterize a $3.4 billion loan as eligible for 
TARP, which was earmarked for banks—the Hartford sold the bank two years later.9 
3	  
	  
The Fed and Treasury were running a kind of soup kitchen for financially 
strapped institutions, so many and varied that the Treasury Secretary, Henry M. 
Paulson Jr., a former chairman of Goldman Sachs, wondered in bemusement, “Who 
are these guys that just keep coming?”10 Americans recoil at government 
assistance to failed private enterprise, though such incidents recur in U.S. 
economic history. A few recent episodes include the Chrysler Corporation of the 
late 1970s, the savings-and-loan industry in the 1980s, and both the automotive 
and financial sector in 2008–2009. Even as officials orchestrate vital stabilizing 
efforts, the public, politicians, and media strenuously protest. Often using strident 
rhetoric, critics object that the “taxpayers” are “bailing out” irresponsible 
corporations. Government officials charged with the unloved task of executing the 
mission avoid using words like bailout; some try earnestly to show that they are 
punishing rather than rescuing. In the 2008 financial crisis, though government’s 
intentions were kept opaque, the result both vilified and victimized AIG: 
government made AIG the “poster child” for the unpopularity of bailouts while 
also imposing the most punishing terms imaginable unlike those imposed on any 
other financial institution. 
Through the weekend of September 13–14, 2008, AIG continued to appeal 
for access to the Fed’s discount window, as it had been requesting since late July, 
on terms that would be routinely granted to others. Willumstad dispatched vice 
chairman Jacob Frenkel, a dean of international finance and former head of the Israeli 
central bank, who maintained professional relationships with many senior officials of 
the Fed and Treasury.11 Frenkel told the officials that AIG would run out of liquid 
funds in 5 to 10 days. To help AIG survive, it sought an emergency loan from the Fed. 
Timothy F. Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, overseer of 
New York–based banks, sent members of his staff to AIG to study the matter.12 But 
the officials would make no commitments at that point, as the top brass, Geithner and 
Paulson of the Treasury, were preoccupied with the fate of Lehman Brothers, the 
investment bank that would soon fail. 
So AIG kept seeking nongovernment solutions.13 Attempts, begun during 
the last week of August, included assembling private equity investors, strategic 
buyers, and sovereign wealth funds to discuss investment options.14 The 
government discouraged AIG from pursuing foreign sources, however, such as 
sovereign wealth funds or private investors, though many such prospects knew 
AIG very well.15 AIG’s management also considered an insolvency filing under 
state insurance laws, which would continue to segregate the insurance companies, 
all liquid, solvent, and well capitalized.16 The process would isolate AIG’s 
disastrous noninsurance businesses, especially the financial products and securities 
lending divisions, thus protecting policyholders while potentially cutting 
shareholder losses as well.  
 On Monday morning, September 15, Lehman filed for federal bankruptcy, 
wiping out its shareholders’ equity.17 The global financial crisis took another 
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tailspin. Turning their attention to AIG, Paulson and Geithner hastily brokered 
talks between it and a consortium of domestic banks led by Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley.18 Greenberg, on behalf of himself, Starr 
International Company (SICO), then AIG’s largest shareholder, and the Starr 
Foundation, another large shareholder, asked to attend these meetings, but 
representatives of Paulson’s and Geithner’s offices refused the request. There 
Greenberg would have seen conflicts of interest that would be widely documented 
after the fact: a global financial intervention being orchestrated using a coterie of 
firms representing multiple clients and opposing interests all at once.19 
That Monday afternoon, rating agencies downgraded AIG’s long-term 
credit rating, and its stock price plunged. AIG could not access short-term liquid 
funds in the credit markets and was prepared to take the ultimate step of drawing 
down its back-up lines of credit, which Willumstad analogized to a captain 
abandoning ship.20 Geithner opposed this move.21 He and Paulson decided that the 
government would step in, though eschewing any sense that government’s 
overtures toward AIG would be any sort of “bailout.”22 
The next day, Tuesday, September 16, Geithner and Paulson called 
Willumstad to inform him of their decision and the terms, which—true to 
Paulson’s commitment that this was no “bailout” of AIG—were mandatory, 
nonnegotiable and punishing.23 The government would take 79.9 percent of AIG’s 
ownership, initially in the form of a new preferred stock that could be issued 
quickly and massively dilute existing common shareholders; separately, it would 
also lend $85 billion, at a 14 percent annual rate, vastly exceeding the prevailing 
market interest rate of 1.5 percent, fully secured by 100 percent of AIG’s assets 
and to be repaid within two years.24 The only way such a loan could be repaid was 
by selling substantial assets.  
Willumstad received a formal statement of those terms at 4:00 P.M., ahead 
of an emergency board meeting set for 5:00 P.M. The terms were bizarre: there was 
no relationship between the stock and the loan, as the government would keep the 
stock even after AIG repaid the loan in full. It was as if your bank lent you money 
to buy a home, and even if you repaid the loan, they took ownership of your home 
as well. The government had “rescued” a number of institutions during the 
financial crisis and not one was subject to such arbitrary and punishing terms.  
At 4:40 P.M., minutes before the AIG board meeting, Paulson and Geithner 
called Willumstad to add yet more pressure: “This is the only proposal you’re 
going to get,” Geithner threatened, making it clear that the government was giving 
more an ultimatum than an opportunity.25 Paulson gave a further order: the 
government was replacing Willumstad, effective immediately.26 Aware that he had 
scant legal authority to fire Willumstad or commandeer AIG’s equity, Paulson that 




Within three hours of receiving government’s ultimatum, AIG’s board 
capitulated. Yet it lacked detailed information about the matter. No one—not the 
board, nor the government—had made any assessment of AIG’s business value. 
No one could make even a rough guess about whether what the government was 
providing was proportional to what it was taking.29 
During the earlier call, Willumstad learned from Paulson that his successor 
would be Edward M. Liddy, causing Willumstad and his advisers on the phone to 
wonder: Ed Liddy? Liddy, a former head of Allstate Corporation, a domestic firm 
specializing in car insurance, was a strange choice to run AIG, as AIG directors at 
the emergency board meeting observed.30 Liddy had presided over the break up in 
the 1990s of Sears, Roebuck & Company, from which Allstate had been spun out. 
Paulson and Liddy, fellow Chicagoans, were also friends. Several years earlier, 
when Paulson ran Goldman Sachs, he nominated Liddy to join that firm’s board of 
directors, where Liddy still served31 and in which he owned millions of dollars’ 
worth of stock.32 Goldman and AIG were then engaged in multibillion-dollar 
negotiations over the value of securities AIG had insured, revolving around how 
much collateral AIG was required to post to Goldman and what ultimate payments 
would be due. Liddy would effectively become a one-man creditor’s committee, 
following orders from Paulson and Geithner, not advocating for the interests of 
AIG or its shareholders.  
Willumstad had promptly called Greenberg to report the government’s 
punishing terms, stressing that they did not resemble any of the financial support 
the government dispensed to hundreds of other financial institutions. On the 
contrary, as one senior Fed official explained, the security that Paulson and 
Geithner demanded for the loan—100 percent of AIG’s $800 billion in assets—
was enough to secure the entire debt held by the Federal Reserve.33 Greenberg 
immediately tried to contact Paulson and Geithner. Paulson’s assistant said that the 
Treasury Secretary was unavailable but would return the call. Paulson ducked the 
discussion, leaving a message on Greenberg’s office voicemail at 5:30 A.M. the 
next morning. The two never spoke.  
Determining why Paulson avoided Greenberg requires speculation. It 
cannot be simply because Paulson was too busy, or struck by panic or fear, as his 
memoirs reveal an intense daily work schedule. Every day he made scores of calls 
and participated in dozens of meetings addressing vexing challenges. Perhaps 
Paulson’s avoidance was due to his awareness of the dubious legality of his 
actions concerning AIG. He may have felt uncomfortable knowing that the 
decisions would benefit Goldman Sachs, his former firm, by inflicting pain on 
AIG, both in dollar-for-dollar terms and in terms of incalculable damage to 
corporate reputation. One can only wonder, however, as Paulson’s lengthy 
memoirs do not discuss it or mention Greenberg.  
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Reaching Geithner later that Tuesday, Greenberg spoke plainly: “As the 
representatives of AIG’s largest shareholders, we want a seat at the table in any 
discussion of the company’s future.” Greenberg said they urgently needed to 
explore alternative solutions to FP’s liquidity needs, finding the planned state 
takeover deplorable for many reasons, including the massive dilution of existing 
common stockholders and draconian loan terms. Greenberg specifically suggested 
adding foreign investors, which the government had earlier discouraged, or 
providing partial government guarantees of FP’s obligations, as Paulson and 
Geithner had arranged for Citigroup and others. Either would solve FP’s liquidity 
crunch, Greenberg explained, reminding Geithner that AIG as a whole, and every 
one of its insurance companies, had ample capital and was healthily solvent. “I 
hear you,” Geithner said, indicating that he would get back to Greenberg. He never 
did.  
At 8:30 A.M. on Wednesday September 17, Liddy appeared at 70 Pine 
Street, along with Dan H. Jester, Paulson’s aide at the Treasury Department and 
also a former Goldman banker, as were many of Paulson’s aides at Treasury. 
Willumstad asked the two how he could be helpful in the impending transition. 
They said he could sign a document authorizing the government’s takeover of 
AIG. Willumstad immediately declined. Besides finding the terms of the deal 
unattractive for AIG, Paulson had fired him the night before and anointed Liddy 
his successor.34 
Liddy signed the first batch of formal takeover papers on September 23; 
Goldman Sachs announced his resignation from its board on September 26, stating 
the resignation was effective as of September 23.35 The conflict of interest was 
clear but ignored: a Goldman director signed over AIG to the government, which 
would then call the shots in settling fateful negotiations between the two 
companies.  
Willumstad had expected that when FP resolved disputes with customers 
over how much it owed, they would give concessions and settle disputes at a 
discount from face value—something less than 100 cents on the dollar.36 Any 
rational party in the strained commercial situation would have asked for a 
discount, and any reasonable party in the trying financial circumstances would 
have granted it.37 One FP customer made it clear that it believed it was only right 
to reach such a compromise.38 Another developed a range of discounts for 
negotiation, indicating a reasonable range might extend as low as 40 cents on the 
dollar, given prevailing severe credit market conditions.39 
Paulson and Geithner, however, engineered the opposite. AIG paid 100 
cents on the dollar to every one of FP’s 16 largest financial product customers, a 
clique of Wall Street firms and foreign banks, led by Goldman Sachs.40 The 
actions made it clear that government’s interest was not so much to help AIG but 
to use AIG to flood the market with capital, without publicly tarnishing the image 
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of the recipients as “bailout” bandits. Government officials began to implement 
the plan on November 5 and 6. They created a special conduit, called Maiden Lane 
III. (The name reflected the location of the offices of the New York Fed, but was 
an ironic choice considering that 102 Maiden Lane was the location for many 
years of the offices of both Starr and Greenberg.) 
Government officials funded the conduit in part by equity that AIG staked 
and in part by loans the Fed added. The officials then contacted FP’s 16 largest 
customers and offered to pay off their outstanding contracts, by surrendering 
previously-posted collateral and covering any shortfall in cash via the conduit. The 
officials did not broach possible discounts in half of those contacts.41 To the half 
given that suggestion, officials asked the customer to make a proposal within 24 or 
48 hours. None did.42 As for the two customers who had volunteered to give a 
discount, officials insisted on paying them 100 cents on the dollar anyway.43 
Officials transferred $60 billion of funds nominally at AIG’s disposal to the 
following banks, with no strings attached44: Société Générale $16.5 billion; 
Goldman Sachs $14 billion; Deutsche Bank $8.5 billion; Merrill Lynch $6.2 
billion; Calyon $4.3 billion; UBS $3.8 billion; and another 10 at an average of $1 
billion each. 
To ordinary observers, the government’s decision sounds like a waste of 
AIG’s corporate assets. Geithner offered a strained rationale for his actions45: 
If we had sought to force counterparties to accept less than they 
were legally entitled to, market participants would have lost 
confidence in AIG and the ratings agencies would have 
downgraded AIG again. This could have led to the company`s 
collapse, threatened our efforts to rebuild confidence in the 
financial system, and meant a deeper recession, more financial 
turmoil, and a much higher cost for American taxpayers.  
Government officials invested considerable effort in hiding these 
arrangements from the public. They succeeded, in part, as it would take three 
months before outsiders began to learn what the government was up to with 
AIG—and several years to learn the full scale of funding made to essentially every 
financial institution other than AIG. Among government’s efforts at secrecy, in 
December 2008, after these payouts were completed, AIG’s lawyers drafted and 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission an investor disclosure 
document that described how AIG had settled all these contracts at 100 cents on 
the dollar.46 Before the filing was publicly released, AIG’s general counsel 
reviewed it with the Fed, the company’s controlling shareholder. The Fed objected 
to disclosing these facts, insisting that AIG’s lawyers remove the statements. The 
SEC said it would only allow that if AIG filed a formal request for confidentiality, 
which the Fed insisted that it do.  
Not until March 15, 2009, after snooping from the press and pressure from 
Congress, did the government reluctantly disclose these clandestine payouts.47 
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Howls of criticism resulted, as the government’s actions in this matter were 
condemned in all subsequent official reports48 and most media.49 The scheme 
distorted markets and rewarded those who made bad bets on risky trades.50 That 
created what is often referred to as “moral hazard,” providing downside protection 
for peoples’ excessively risky decisions. Nor was the scheme necessary: 
negotiating commercially reasonable discounts would have inflicted limited pain 
on the banks—which were substantially hedged on these trades51—and alleviated 
the punishing effects on AIG. To critics, it appeared as if cronyism rather than 
commercial sense drove government decisions.52 
Not only did the government keep the terms of its dealings quiet, AIG was 
prohibited for speaking about them as well. The prohibition emanated from 
congressional grandstanding during debates about the government’s intervention 
amid the crisis. One week after Paulson’s decision to inject capital into AIG, 
Representative Harry Waxman of California showed a photograph during an open 
committee session of what he said was an AIG executive retreat at a lavish resort 
in Monarch Beach.53 As other committee members and journalists piled on, 
Americans recoiled in disgust, venomously protesting the obscenity of “taxpayer 
money” funding such luxury. The party may have been today’s version of the 
three-martini lunch that Greenberg decades ago squashed at AIG, though insiders 
say it was a party not for AIG executives but agents it relied on for business and 
was paid by insurance subsidiaries that did not receive government funds.54 But it 
was one of a dozen examples of public protest against uses of funds by AIG—the 
ultimate revolt arose in March 2009 over bonuses AIG paid its FP executives.55  
Responding to such uproars, AIG’s government relations department 
decided to suspend its traditional activities, such as lobbying or edifying public 
opinion. The government liked AIG’s reticence policy and insisted that the 
company commit to it in the takeover documents that Paulson and Geithner 
proposed and Liddy signed.56 The clause cannot be changed without government 
approval.57 AIG is therefore barred from publicly challenging any terms that 
government imposed, whether the taking of 79.9 percent of its equity, the 
appointment of Liddy as chief executive or any term of the loans. The clause, 
which remained in effect through the writing of this book, provided political cover 
to the officials, something they could point to as showing that government was 
controlling how taxpayer funds were being spent. The constraint on AIG remained 
tight, though by consultation between AIG’s general counsel and the Fed, AIG is 
allowed to participate in limited lobbying on major pending legislation. 
Another device the government used to protect the arrangements it 
implemented was even more extraordinary and permanent: the payout agreements 
the government had AIG sign with Goldman Sachs and the other banks contained 
AIG’s binding release of the other side from any liability.58 AIG surrendered any 
right to sue Goldman and the others for any reason.59 On their face, such 
provisions seem out of place in the transactions. True, a settlement of claims 
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would ordinarily include a release of liability, but in this case AIG was paying out 
100 cents on the dollar, warranting them in releasing AIG, not the other way 
around. 
A possible explanation is that AIG had rights against Goldman and other 
customers for any misrepresentations to AIG about the quality of mortgage 
securities pooled for coverage. In April 2010, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission filed a case against Goldman alleging it had fraudulently 
misrepresented the quality of similar pools in a transaction called Abacus. 
Goldman settled the case by paying $550 million.60 The releases AIG signed, at 
the government’s behest, seem to prevent AIG from filing similar claims against 
Goldman and other recipient banks, such as the $10 billion fraud suit AIG filed 
against Bank of America, which was not among the government-favored banks.61 
The government went to great lengths to secure control over AIG, riding 
roughshod over state corporate law in the process. The preferred stock it 
demanded on day one was easy enough for the corporation to issue without the 
need for shareholder approval. But at the time, AIG’s corporate charter did not 
authorize it to issue the large number of common shares the government sought. 
The charter authorized issuing 5 billion common shares, 3 billion of which were 
outstanding. One way to enable the government to own 79.9 percent of the total 
shares would be to increase the number of authorized shares to above 5 billion and 
issue all the unissued shares to the government. (For example, increasing the total 
authorized to more than 12 billion and issuing all but the 3 billion already 
outstanding to the government.) Changing AIG’s corporate charter to increase the 
number of authorized common shares required a vote of the existing common 
shareholders voting as a separate group—not counting the government’s preferred 
shares. That requirement is designed to protect the common shareholders because 
increasing the number of shares decreases each shareholder’s percentage 
ownership interest (called “dilution” in corporate parlance).   
Knowing this, the government’s agreement with AIG called for proposing 
to amend AIG’s corporate charter to increase the authorized common shares. A 
vote of the common shareholders would occur at the company’s next annual 
shareholders’ meeting set for June 2009. Company officials assured the 
shareholders, as well as a judge, that it would submit a proposal for a vote of the 
common shareholders voting as a group.62 The company listed such a vote on the 
agenda for the meeting.63 Expectably, the shareholders voted it down, since the 
dilution would be massive: someone owning 10 percent of the outstanding 
common shares before the vote would own only about 2 percent if the new shares 
were issued.  
Anticipating that outcome, the government-directed AIG had added a 
second proposal to achieve its objective, one that it believed did not require a 
separate vote of the common shareholders but a vote in which it could cast its 
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preferred share votes as well, guaranteeing victory. Rather than increasing the 
number of authorized shares above 5 billion, this approach would reduce the 
number of outstanding shares to significantly less than 5 billion. Called a “reverse 
stock split,” the government proposed to reclassify each existing common share 
into one-twentieth of a share. As a result, only 150 million shares would be 
outstanding, leaving 4.85 billion that could be issued to the government. By that 
subterfuge, government forced formal shareholder “approval” of its equity 
takeover of AIG.64 
Geithner subsequently offered different accounts of his thinking in all these 
decisions about AIG. He once contended that his purpose was to protect AIG 
policyholders.65 AIG’s policyholders, however, were not at risk, as its insurance 
subsidiaries were segregated by state law and under little financial pressure: they 
were liquid and solvent.66 In fact, AIG’s insurance subsidiaries were so safe and 
sound throughout its liquidity crunch that the New York State Insurance 
Department authorized the parent company to use $20 billion of subsidiary capital 
to ease the liquidity pressure.67 
Ultimately, Paulson and Geithner chose a “public purpose” rationale for 
their actions. They said that their decision to seize AIG, impose punishing terms, 
and then exercise total control over it—including transferring substantial capital to 
Goldman Sachs—was to protect America from a financial meltdown, though 
without explaining exactly how that would occur. Testifying before Congress in 
January 2010, Paulson said,68 “If AIG collapsed, it would have buckled our 
financial system and wrought economic havoc on the lives of millions of our 
citizens.” Geithner echoed the testimony at the same time69:  
[We] were motivated solely by what we believed to be in the best 
interest of the American people. We did not act because AIG asked 
for assistance. We did not act to protect the financial interests of 
individual institutions. We did not act to help foreign banks. We 
acted because the consequences of AIG failing at that time, in 
those circumstances, would have been catastrophic for our 
economy and for American families and businesses. 
By refusing to lend to AIG through the standard route of the Fed’s discount 
window, the government failed to exercise its valid authority. An important 
purpose of the discount window is to provide short-term liquidity during credit 
crunches that threaten the economy. Lending helps healthy firms needing short-
term bridges during a crisis period and is neither intended to sustain failing firms 
nor limited to banks. During the 2008–2009 crisis, however, the discount window 
was used to fund at least 100 banks that failed within a year and was closed to 
AIG despite its abundant long-term capital and ownership of a savings and loan 
association. Experts detected politics playing an inappropriate role in the Fed’s 
decisions.70 Had the Fed opened the discount window to AIG, FP’s liquidity crisis 
would have been nipped in the bud.  
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There was no legal authority to permit the government to oust Willumstad 
or commandeer 79.9 percent of AIG’s equity. Officials had authority to lend 
money to AIG, or anyone else, under the pre-Depression era statute creating the 
Fed. But while this statute also allowed the Fed to assume control of banks in 
extraordinary circumstances, it did not authorize the Fed to seize ownership of 
insurance companies or replace their senior executives. Nor did any laws Congress 
passed abruptly during the financial crisis, such as TARP, provide such authority. 
(In any event, TARP was not enacted until October, after Treasury’s intervention 
at AIG.)71  
Paulson, in his memoirs, suggested the shaky ground for his and Geithner’s 
actions concerning AIG.72 He recounted warnings he gave to President Bush about 
needing congressional authority as well as inconclusive meetings he held with 
congressional leaders.73 They raised doubts about the legality of this seizure and 
told the Secretary he was acting not by the authority of Congress but on his own. 
Paulson was correct that his actions were not a “taxpayer bailout of AIG,” at least 
not entirely. In significant part, they were a covert bailout of Goldman Sachs and 
Wall Street and foreign banks. Had officials in other countries seized property in 
similar circumstances, U.S. authorities, including Secretary Paulson and President 
Bush, would have cried foul, classifying it as nationalizing and expropriating 
private assets.74 They would declare the action a violation of the rule of law and 
basic principles of a free society—values AIG embraced and projected worldwide 
for many decades and now found, paradoxically, its own government flouting.  
Having ousted Willumstad and commandeered voting control of AIG, 
Paulson and Geithner’s installation of Liddy as chief executive was effective for 
them. Liddy embraced the rationales Paulson and Geithner testified to, believing 
that his duty was not to AIG and its shareholders but to the public. Liddy 
testified75: “The U.S. government determined that a collapse of AIG and the 
consequent blows to our counterparties and customers around the world posed too 
great a risk to the global economy, particularly in the context of the near or actual 
failure of other financial institutions.”76  
Days after the takeover, Paulson announced on Meet the Press, a national 
television show, that AIG was to be liquidated.77 The selling of AIG’s assets, 
which Liddy promptly began under what he called “Project Destiny,”78 would 
continue for years. Such action became necessary due to the combination of 
punishing terms the government imposed and its decision to divert considerable 
capital to others. AIG had a greater need for liquid capital after government’s 
intervention than before.  
To obtain it, AIG was forced to sell substantial assets—at a time when 
global market conditions meant that they would fetch discounted prices. This put 
AIG on a debtor’s treadmill: more payments due the government, in a short period 
of time at high interest rates, than its business generated. It had to keep selling 
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assets, which further reduced revenue, ad infinitum. This prompted some experts 
to wonder whether, as structured, AIG could ever repay the government’s loans 
and escape its clutch.79 The compulsory sale of assets at discounts to repay the 
government was anguishing for the legions of AIG employees worldwide who 
dedicated their careers to building the businesses.80 
Among the assets sold:  
§ AIA, the flagship Asian insurance company that was among AIG’s most 
valuable assets. 
§ Philamlife, the crown jewel life insurance company in the Philippines, 
which AIG divested by first folding it into AIA for reasons that remain 
mysterious. 
§ ALICO, the prized global life insurance company. 
§ Trans Re, the reinsurance company acquired in 1968 and then grown 
into a force in reinsurance. 
§ Nan Shan, the life insurance company in Taiwan acquired in 1970 with 
the help of K. K. Tse. 
§ Hartford Steam Boiler, the fabled engineering and industrial equipment 
insurer that AIG acquired in 1999. 
§ AIG’s investment in the Blackstone Group. 
§ Most of AIG’s iconic buildings around the world, including its 
landmark 70 Pine Street headquarters building in New York and its 
storied Tokyo locale featuring a monumental sculpture of Starr installed 
at the 1974 dedication ceremony. 
Many of these sales were made at prices the buyers considered a steal. AIG 
sold 70 Pine in 2009 for $150 million to a Korean investment firm; not two years 
later, that firm flipped the building, for $205 million, to a New York real estate 
developer for conversion into residential condominiums.81 HSB was sold in 2008 
for $742 million, down from AIG’s 1999 purchase price of $1.2 billion, which the 
buyer’s CFO said on a conference call was “very low.”82 The Wall Street Journal 
lampooned the very low price as reflecting a “giant neon ‘fire sale’ sign” hanging 
on AIG.83  
Senior executives of Nippon Life Insurance Company, buyer of the Tokyo 
building, told Greenberg that they regarded the deal as an unbelievable bargain. 
For AIG employees in Japan, this sale to a competitor was an extraordinary loss of 
face. Nippon proceeded to tear the building down with plans to erect a larger more 
modern structure on the plot and adjoining land. It is not known what the parties 
did with the commemorative bust of Starr.  
The piecemeal selling of discrete businesses, such as Nan Shan in Taiwan 
or HSB in the United States, neglected to capture the synergistic value of those 
operations within the broader AIG family. Sold as stand-alone entities, the going 
price was less than their value within broader business segments at AIG. 
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Management initially ran away from the AIG brand, rebranding many retained 
companies as “Chartis.” Rebranding exercises are costly, likely reaching tens of 
millions of dollars, and of uncertain value.84 AIG’s decision must have assumed 
that 40 years of brand development became worthless or worse in a matter of 
months. Perhaps it did. But the move did not support favorable valuations of the 
AIG businesses being sold out of the family. These decisions attested to the short-
term view AIG was operating under, which contradicted its traditional long-term 
horizon based on notions such as patient capital that were its trademark 
worldwide. 
Hope eventually emerged that AIG could avert the course toward 
destruction. In early 2009, it had become clear that AIG needed new senior 
management. Greenberg urged Robert Benmosche, the distinguished former head 
of MetLife then in retirement, to take the position of CEO. After several 
discussions that met considerable resistance, Greenberg finally persuaded 
Benmosche to consider the job. In searching for a new CEO, the Fed took a 
leading role, and Geithner asked Greenberg for his assessment of Benmosche. 
Greenberg gave a ringing endorsement.  
Benmosche became CEO of AIG in August 2009. He immediately began 
returning the company to its traditions and cultures and even restored the AIG 
brand name. He said that the company’s ability to weather all the upheaval of the 
Spitzer assault and the U.S. government takeover was due to the outstanding 
workforce that Greenberg had assembled and left behind.85 Those employees—the 
innovative, entrepreneurial and loyal backbone of AIG for decades—continue to 
give it promise today.   
* * * * * 
 
 The government’s takeover of AIG prompted SICO, AIG’s largest 
shareholder after the government, to challenge the government action in a lawsuit. 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution directs that the U.S. government 
cannot deprive anyone of “property without due process of law” and forbids the 
government from appropriating private property “for public use, without just 
compensation.” The government is not empowered to trample shareholder and 
property rights even in the midst of a financial emergency, SICO stressed. True, 
public policy goals can justify the taking of private property, the company 
acknowledged, but that does not change the requirement that government pay fair 
price for what it takes.  
It may be necessary for government to intervene in private enterprise to 
rescue the country’s financial system, but that does not change the constitutional 
mandate. Perhaps especially in the exigent circumstances of the financial crisis, 
government must not ignore basic legal and constitutional rights. The 
government’s taking of an 79.9 percent equity stake for essentially no 
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compensation, while separately providing loans that the company had to repay, 
and without a required shareholder vote, demanded due process and just 
compensation, SICO contended. 86 [  
SICO also challenged how the Fed, as controlling shareholder of AIG, 
operated the company after assuming control. Under state corporation law, 
controlling shareholders such as the Fed owe fiduciary duties to their fellow 
shareholders, which SICO alleged the Fed breached.87 The Fed breached these 
duties by causing AIG’s credit default swap counterparties to be paid 100 cents on 
the dollar when they could have been compromised for substantially less than that, 
SICO argued. The government apparently wished to help recipients weather the 
crisis and do so in a way that avoided any need for the government to confront the 
public and political opposition its program almost certainly would have 
engendered, SICO said. That may or may not have been good public policy, but 
using AIG funds to assist other troubled financial institutions violated the Fed’s 
duties as the controlling shareholder of AIG to its fellow shareholders. SICO also 
contended that the Fed likewise violated its duties when concealing these dealings 
for several months and in helping to orchestrate the issuance of a massive number 
of new common shares to deliver to the government in violation of state 
corporation law.   
In both cases, SICO acknowledged that government had a legitimate 
interest in resolving the financial crisis but stressed that this interest did not give it 
a license to rob Peter to pay Paul. One objection to SICO’s lawsuits against the 
government is that all government did was force AIG and its shareholders to bear 
the costs of risks it undertook in operating its business. But that is not an accurate 
or faithful account of what happened. The government’s approach imposed on 
AIG the costs of the risky businesses engaged in by Goldman and the others. True, 
the public should not be obliged to pay for the costs of private risk taking, but 
neither should a private company be obliged to pay for the costs of private risk 
taking of other companies.  
One might ask how AIG allowed itself to be treated as it was by the 
government. There appeared to be little push back. Granted, Willumstad and 
Frenkel sought feverishly to find liquidity sources. But they were rebuffed and 
seemed simply unable to persuade authorities of the dire straits. When it was 
finally AIG’s turn for assistance, Paulson and Geithner gave an ultimatum to 
which the board surrendered within hours. 
Greenberg would not have allowed any of this activity to proceed, and had 
he been in the boardroom that night, he simply would have told the government 
no. But suppose that the particular AIG board assembled that night felt that it had 
few choices. If so, that would be due to many decisions made during the previous 
42 months. Those began in early 2005 with Eliot Spitzer’s decision to threaten 
AIG without investigating and the capitulation to that pressure by PwC and the 
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incumbent AIG board, with the assistance of lawyers from Paul Weiss and 
Simpson Thacher. These were followed in late 2005 and early 2006 by the radical 
changes in corporate governance and culture initiated by Arthur Levitt and 
embraced by Frank Zarb. A board and management ceased to exercise the 
disciplined, systematic methodologies that made AIG great, plunging the company 
into chaos. Paulson, a wise man of Wall Street who heard Spitzer’s speech 
indicting Greenberg back in February 2005, surely detected this disarray in 
September 2008. Like dogs sensing weakness, he and the Goldman alumni on his 
staff may have found it convenient to roll over AIG in order to prop up their old 
firm. Geithner, who implemented much of the nationalization of AIG, may have 
found it appealing to protect the favored financial institutions he oversaw as 
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